Wednesday, 26 February 2014

Blast Off for King from Florida's Space Belt? Not Quite

In Maryland v. King,1/ the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of taking DNA from individuals merely arrested of crimes. The majority relied on the perceived value of DNA profiling following by trawls of DNA databases of profiles from unsolved crimes to inform bail determinations and other pretrial decisions. The idea is that the arrestee might be linked to an unsolved crime, which would be good to know before critical decisions are made or become irrevocable.

Although such pretrial hits to unrelated crimes are rarely made with lightning speed, the Court suggested that this situation could change (just as it did with the introduction of computerized fingerprint matching). The majority wrote that:
[T]he FBI has already begun testing devices that will enable police to process the DNA of arrestees within 90 minutes. ... . An assessment and understanding of the reasonableness of this minimally invasive search of a person detained for a serious crime should take account of these technical advances. ... New technology will only further improve its speed and therefore its effectiveness.2/
Yesterday, Florida’s Space Coast Daily newspaper announced a “first-ever application of rapid DNA technology.”3/ “In January 2014,” police in the city of Palm Bay, south of Melbourne, “began processing samples from active cases” with IntegenX’s RapidHIT 200 device for producing STR profiles in about 90 minutes. They struck paydirt in the investigation of a September 2013 home burglary that netted “approximately $30,000 worth of property including firearms, electronic equipment, computers, TV’s, military equipment including a bulletproof vest, clothing, several guitars and even the cable box.”

Despite the "first-ever" buzz, other localities are using the same technology operationally. In South Carolina, for example, it fingered "one of three suspects in a string of burglaries in northeast Richland County from December 2013 to February 2014."4/

Does this mean that the Court’s prediction has come true, that arrestee DNA is being processed within a two-hour window? Hardly. The Palm Bay case concerned an individual who already had been “arrested for the crime based on witness statements and other evidence. A blood sample taken from the scene was run through the RapidHIT 200 which yielded a profile that matched the same suspect who had been arrested and charged with the crime.” This is not a case in which an automated, rapid system for DNA profiling was applied to acquire an arrestee profile for checking against a DNA database for unsolved crimes, as the King Court contemplated.

Nevertheless, when validated, the rapid processing power certainly can be applied to arrestee samples. Those are easier to analyze than are the often messier crime-scene samples that the Palm Bay police are profiling with the technology. The Court’s prediction may seem space age, but it is not particularly futuristic.

Indeed, the article goes on to suggest that by uploading the RapidHIT profiles into a local database of “Palm Bay and several local agencies, including Melbourne, West Melbourne and Cocoa Police,” police in the region are in a position to identify “suspects who cross jurisdictions to commit their crimes.” Of course, this is what Florida’s SDIS (State DNA Index System) does. Presumably, the objective of these police agencies is to do it more nimbly and quickly. Yet, that, in turn, creates alarms about “rogue databases” operating outside a statutory framework.

Postscript

"IntegenX Inc. has met the FBI guidelines to upload directly to the NDIS system known arrestee and convicted offender DNA profiles, as well as casework known samples, generated with the RapidHIT System using Life Technologies GlobalFiler Express kits from Thermo Fisher Scientific." IntegenX Inc., RapidHIT System Approved to Upload DNA Profiles to National Database, Forensic Mag.,
Mar. 19, 2014.

Notes

1. 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013).
2. Id. at 1977.
3. Palm Bay Police Nail Crooks With DNA Evidence, Space Coast Daily, Feb. 25, 2014, http://spacecoastdaily.com/2014/02/palm-bay-police-nail-crooks-with-dna-evidence/.
4. Cassie Cope, Richland Sheriff’s Department’s New Machine Analyzes DNA in 90 Minutes, State (S.Car.), Feb. 27, 2014, http://www.thestate.com/2014/02/27/3295469/richland-sheriffs-departments.html#storylink=cpy.

Previous Postings on the Opinions in Maryland v. King

Sunday, 26 January 2014

Hundreds of Errors in DNA Databases: What Do They Mean?

The other day, the New York Times reported that "[t]he Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a review of a national DNA database, has identified nearly 170 profiles that probably contain errors" and that "New York State authorities have turned up mistakes in DNA profiles in New York’s database."

Apparently, nearly all the errors involve a recorded profile that differs from the true profile at one (and only one) allele. These "mistakes were discovered in July, when the F.B.I., using improved software, broadened the search parameters used to detect matches. The change, one F.B.I. scientist said, was like upgrading or refining 'a spell-check.' In 166 instances, the new search found DNA profiles in the database that were almost identical but conflicted at a single point."

This discovery raises several questions. How prevalent are these errors? What caused them? And, what investigative or prosecutorial errors could they cause?

I. Prevalence and Causes

The article observes that "[t]he errors identified so far implicate only a tiny fraction of the total DNA profiles in the national database, which holds nearly 13 million profiles, more than 12 million from convicts and suspects, and an additional 527,000 from crime scenes." Thus, "Alice R. Isenberg, the chief of the biometric analysis section of the F.B.I. Laboratory, said that ... 'We were pleasantly surprised it was only 166. ... These are incredibly small numbers for the size of the database.'" She believes "most of the 166 cases probably resulted from interpretation errors by DNA analysts or typographical errors introduced when a lab worker uploaded the series of numbers denoting a person’s DNA profile."

II. Consequences: Risks of False Hits and Misses

It is true that 166 is a small fraction--about 0.0013%--of all the profiles on record. But it would be interesting to know whether these discrepancies are concentrated in the known offender or arrestee profiles or in the ones from crime scenes (the "forensic index").

A. Errors in the Offender-arresstee Indices

Suppose first that the profile of an individual in an offender or arrestee index departs from the true profile of that individual by a single allele. If that individual committed an offense for which a crime-scene profile is recovered, he would not be noticed in a database trawl (unless the search program flagged near misses like this). This would be a false negative error.

How probable is this false negative error? There have been less than 230,000 hits (see http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics) between profiles in the forensic index and the more than 12,000,000 profiles in the offender and arrestee indices. This means that an individual has about a 1.9% chance of being linked to a crime through the database. Assuming that all 166 misrecorded or mistyped profiles are in the offender-arrestee indices, it follows that the probability that one or more of these errors would yield a false negative is 166 x 0.0013% x 1.9% = 0.000042 = 0.0042%. Even if the 166 errors were the tip of the proverbial iceberg, 90% of which lies below the visible surface, the probability of a false negative resulting from the inaccurate profiles is only 0.042%.

If the inaccurate profile pertains to a offender or an arrestee, as we have assumed so far, then the probability of a false positive -- a hit to an individual represented in the database who is not the source of the crime-scene sample -- typically is even smaller. A false positive could occur if someone else in the world has a true profile that (1) is not in the offender-arrestee index and (2) perfectly matches the inaccurate profile in the index. Because all DNA profiles consisting of substantial number of loci are rare, the probability of a false positive must be small. 1/

B. Errors in the Forensic Index

Of course, all the inaccurate profiles did not come from previous offenders or arrestees. Some came from the crime-scene samples -- producing erroneous entries in the forensic index. These errors "had the effect of obscuring clues, blinding investigators to connections among crime scenes and known offenders" in three cases in New York. When forensic-index errors are present, the risk of a false negative error is much larger. Even if the source of the crime-scene sample is represented in the offender-arrestee indices (as seems to occur for some 2% of these database inhabitants), a database trawl for a match to the erroneous forensic index profile will miss this person.

Again, however, the chance of a false positive -- a hit between the false crime-scene profile and an offender or arrestee profile -- remains low for full DNA profiles. The probability of another person having the same false profile is still quite small. 2/

III. Caveats


The probabilities noted here are the result of back-of-the-envelope calculations (see note 1). Although I would think that more precise analyses would not give dramatically different results, I am not suggesting that the sources of errors reported by the FBI should be ignored or minimized. The incidence of errors in generating and recording data can be reduced, in part by automated systems. 3/ In addition, the estimates I have provided do not pertain to errors resulting from contamination of a crime-scene sample with an innocent suspect's sample and to profiles that are less complete than thirteen loci.

Notes
  1. If each STR allele is present in 10% of the relevant population (the actual values for each allele will vary from case to case) and if 13 loci are in the profile (the current norm), then the probability of a full match to the source of a crime-scene sample is less than (2 x 1/10)13 = 0.00000000082 (if the source of the crime-scene sample and the database inhabitant are unrelated members of a population in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and there is no linkage disequilibrium). Even if the correctly profiled crime-scene sample comes from a brother, the probability of a 13-locus match is only about (1/4 + p/2 + 2p2)13, where p is the average chance that the two alleles will match (the proportion of homozygotes in the population). (National Research Council Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science 1992, p. 167). If the homozygosity rate is, say 30% (which is higher than that reported in Budowle et al. (1999, p. 1278 (tbl. 1)), the probability of a full sibling possessing a one-off profile would only be about 0.00084.
  2. See supra note 1.
  3. Additional recording errors might be detected by massive, all-pairs trawls of the indices in CODIS. These would flag suspiciously similar profiles recorded as coming from what are thought to be different sources.

References

Saturday, 18 January 2014

The Signal, the Noise, and the Errors

Published in September 2012, The Signal and the Noise by Nate Silver soon reached The New York Times best-seller list for nonfiction. Amazon.com named it the best nonfiction book of 2012, and it won the 2013 Phi Beta Kappa Award in science. Not bad for a book that presents Bayes' rule as prescription for better thinking in life and as a model for consensus formation in science. The subtitle, for those who have not read it, is "Why So Many Predictions Fail--But Some Don't," and the explanations include poor data, cognitive biases, and statistical models not grounded in an understanding of the phenomena being modeled.

The book is both thoughtful and entertaining, covering many fields. I learned something about meteorology (your local TV weather forecaster probably is biased toward forecasting bad weather--stick to the National Weather Service forecasts), earthquake predictions, climatology, poker, human and computer chess-playing, equity markets, sports betting, political polling and poor prognostication by pundits, and more. Silver does not pretend to be an expert in all these fields, but he is perceptive and interviewed a lot of interesting people.

Indeed, although Wikipedia describes Silver as "an American statistician and writer who analyzes baseball (see Sabermetrics) and elections (see Psephology)," he does not present himself as as expert in statistics, and statisticians seem conflicted on whether to include him their ranks (see AmStat News). He seems to be pretty much self-educated in the subject, and he advocates "getting your hands dirty with the data set" rather than "spending too much time doing reading and so forth." Frick (2013).

Perhaps that emphasis, combined with the objective of writing an entertaining book for the general public, has something to do with the rather sweeping--and sometimes sloppy--arguments for Bayesian over frequentist methods. Although Silver gives a few engaging and precise examples of Bayes' rule in operation (playing poker or deciding whether your domestic partner is cheating on you, for instance), he is quick to characterize a variety of informal, intuitive modes of combining many different kinds of data as tantamount to following Bayes' rule. Marcus & Davis (2013) identify one telling example--a very successful sports bettor who recognizes the importance of data that the bookies overlook, misjudge, or do not acquire . (Pp. 232-61). What makes this gambler a Bayesian? Silver thinks it is the fact that "[s]uccessful gamblers ... think of the future as speckles of probability, flickering upward and downward like a stock market ticker to every new jolt of information." (P. 237). That's fine, but why presume that the flickers follow Bayes' rule as opposed to some other procedure for updating beliefs? And why castigate frequentist statisticians, as Silver seems to, as "think[ing] of the future in terms of no-lose bets, unimpeachable theories, and infinitely precise measurements"? Ibid. Surely, that is not the world in which statisticians live.

Changing probability judgments does not make someone a Bayesian

In proselytizing for Bayes' theorem and in urging readers to "think probabilistically" (p. 448), Silver also writes that
When you first start to make these probability estimates, they may be quite poor. But there are two pieces of favorable news. First, these estimates are just a starting point: Bayes's theorem will have you revise and improve them as you encounter new information. Second, there is evidence that this is something we can learn to improve. The military, for instance, has sometimes trained soldiers in these techniques,5 with reasonably good results.6 There is also evidence that doctors think about medical diagnoses in a Bayesian manner.7 [¶] It is probably better to follow the lead of our doctors and our soldiers than our television pundits.
It is hard to argue with the concluding sentence, but where is the evidence that many soldiers and doctors are intuitive (or trained) Bayesians? The report cited (n.5) for the proposition that "[t]he military ... has sometimes trained soldiers in the [Bayesian] techniques" says nothing of the kind.* Similarly, the article that is supposed to show that the alleged training in Bayes' rule produces "reasonably good results" is quite wide of the mark. It is a 35-year-old report for the Army on "Training for Calibration" about research that made no effort to train soldiers to use Bayes' rule.**

How about doctors? The source here is an article in the British Medical Journal that asserts that "[c]linicians apply bayesian reasoning in framing and revising differential diagnoses." Gill et al. (2005). But these authors--I won't call them researchers because they did no real research--rely only on their impressions and post hoc explanations for diagnoses that are not expressed probabilistically. As one distinguished physician tartly observed, "[c]linicians certainly do change their minds about the probability of a diagnosis being true as new evidence emerges to improve the odds of being correct, but the similarity to the formal Bayesian procedure is more apparent than real and it is not very likely, in fact, that most clinicians would consider themselves bayesians." Waldron (2008, pp. 2-3 n.2).

The transposition fallacy

Consistent with this tendency to conflate expressing judgments probabilistically with using Bayes' rule to arrive at the assessments, Silver presents probabilities that have nothing to do with Bayes' rule as if they are properly computed posterior probabilities. In particular, he naively transposes conditional probabilities to misrepresent p-values as degrees of belief.

At page 185, he writes that
A once-famous “leading indicator” of economic performance, for instance, was the winner of the Super Bowl. From Super Bowl I in 1967 through Super Bowl XXXI in 1997, the stock market gained an average of 14 percent for the rest of the year when a team from the National Football League (NFL) won the game. But it fell by almost 10% when a team from the original American Football Leage (AFL) won instead. [¶] Through 1997, this indicator had correctly “predicted” the direction of the stock market in twenty-eight of thirty-one years. A standard test of statistical significance, if taken literally, would have implied that there was only about a 1-in-4,700,000 possibility that the relationship had emerged from chance alone.
This is a cute example of the mistake of interpreting a p-value, acquired after a search for significance, as if there had been no such search. As Silver submits, "[c]onsider how creative you might be when you have a stack of economic variables as thick as a phone book." Ibid.

But is the ridiculously small p-value (that he obtained by regressing the S&P 500 index on the conference affiliation of the Super Bowl winner) really the probability "that the relationship had emerged from chance alone"? No, it is the probability that such a remarkable association would be seen if the Super Bowl outcome and the S&P 500 index were entirely uncorrelated (and no one had searched for a data set that shared a seemingly shocking correlation to the S&P 500 index). Silver may be a Bayesian at heart, but he did not compute the probability of the null hypothesis given the data, and it is problematic to tell the reader that a "standard test of statistical significance" (or more precisely, a p-value) gives the (Bayesian) probability that the null hypothesis is true.

Of course, with such an extreme p-value, the misinterpretation might not make any practical difference, but the same misinterpretation is evident in Silver's characterization of a significance test at the 0.05 level. He writes that "[b]ecause 95 percent confidence in a statistical test is Fisher’s traditional dividing line between 'significant' and 'insignificant,' researchers are much more likely to report findings that statistical tests classify as 95.1 percent certain than those they classify as 94.9 percent certain—a practice that seems more superstitious than scientific." (P. 256 n. †). Sure, any rigid dividing line (a procedure that Fisher did not really use) is arbitrary, but rejecting a hypothesis in a classical statistical test at the 0.05 level does not imply a 95% certainty that this rejection is correct.

In transposing conditional probabilities in violation of both Bayesian and frequentist precepts, Silver is in good and plentiful company. As the pages on this blog reveal, theoretical physicists, epidemiologists, judges, lawyers, forensic scientists, journalists, and many other people make this mistake. E.g., The Probability that the Higgs Boson Has Been Discovered, July 6, 2012. Despite its general excellence in describing data-driven thinking, The Signal and the Noise would have benefited from a little more error-correcting code.

Notes

* Rather, Gunzelmann & Gluck (2004) discusses training in unspecified "mission-relevant skills." An "expert model is able to compare their actions against the optimal actions in the task situation" and "identify [trainee errors] and provide specific feedback about why the action was incorrect, what the correct action was, and what the students should do to correct their mistake." The expert model--and not the soldiers--"uses Bayes’ theorem to assess mastery learning based upon the history of success and failure on particular units of skill within the task." Ibid. According to the authors, this "Bayesian knowledge tracing approach" is inadequate because it "does not account for forgetting, and thus cannot provide predictions about skill retention." Ibid.

** Lichtenstein & Fischhoff's (1978) objective was "to help analysts to more accurately use numerical probabilities to indicate their degree of confidence in their decisions." They did not study military analysts, but instead recruited 12 individuals from their personal contacts. They had these trainees assess the probabilities of statements in the areas of geography, history, literature, science, and music. They measured how well calibrated their subjects were. (A well calibrated individual gives correct answers to x% of the questions for which he or she assesses the probability of the given answer to be x%.) The proportion of the subjects whose calibration improved after feedback was 72%. Ibid.

References

Walter Frick, Nate Silver on Finding a Mentor, Teaching Yourself Statistics, and Not Settling in Your Career, Harvard Business Review Blog Network, Sept. 24, 2013, http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/09/nate-silver-on-finding-a-mentor-teaching-yourself-statistics-and-not-settling-in-your-career/.

Christopher J. Gill, Lora Sabin & Christopher H. Schmid, Why Clinicians Are Natural Bayesians, 330 Brit. Med. J. 1080–83 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC557240/

Glenn F. Gunzelmann & Kevin A. Gluck, Knowledge Tracing for Complex Training Applications: Beyond Bayesian Mastery Estimates, in Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference on Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation 383-84 (2004), available at http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/710gunzelmann_gluck-2004.pdf.

Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Training for Calibration, Army Research Institute Technical Report TR-78-A32, Nov. 1978, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a069703.pdf

Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, What Nate Silver Gets Wrong, New Yorker, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/books/2013/01/what-nate-silver-gets-wrong.html

Tony Waldron, Palaeopathology (2008), excerpt available at http://assets.cambridge.org/97805216/78551/excerpt/9780521678551_excerpt.pdf

Thursday, 16 January 2014

Tres Mal Errors with DNA Evidence

A story in the Denver Post (Gurman 2014) begins with the disturbing news that
A malfunction in a DNA processing machine led to the scrambling of samples from 11 Denver police burglary cases, officials acknowledged Friday. It took more than two years for the department to discover the errors. As a result of the mix-up, prosecutors are dismissing burglary cases against four people, three of whom had already pleaded guilty.
What happened?

In 2011, "[a] machine 'froze' while running a tray of 19 DNA samples." An analyst "replaced [the samples] in the wrong order" after asking the manufacturer of the robot how to proceed. More than two years later, "the machine froze for a second time." An analyst called again and "became concerned because the directions seemed different the second time. Further review over the next month revealed" the 2011 error. Ibid.

What of It?

The police department chief of staff observed that "[n]one of the DNA was compromised; it was merely associated with the wrong case when we were done." Ibid. In other words, the crime-scene DNA profiles were mislabeled. Such errors could have helped criminals avoid detection. For instance, a burglar in case A falsely associated with case B might have had a strong alibi defense for case B. Alternatively, such labeling errors could have caused individuals to be convicted of the wrong crime -- perhaps a man guilty of a burglary could have been found guilty of an murder (or vice versa).

In this incident, however, a police spokeswoman said that "[a]ll four people had confessed to at least one burglary, but the DNA error meant they were charged with the wrong ones." Ibid. Prosecutors dismissed the charges against the four, and they will not be tried for the other burglaries because the statute of limitations has expired.

Another "tray mal" case

Misuse of automated machinery for DNA analysis also produced an error--this one involving an entirely innocent man--in "what is described as the most advanced automated DNA testing system in the UK at LGC forensics labs in Teddington." Israel 2012. The machinery extracts DNA from wells in a plastic tray. Police arrested Andrew Scott, 20, after a street fight and sent a saliva to LGC for profiling. (Doyle 2012). Instead of throwing away the tray after the run with Scott's saliva sample, however, a worker reused it in an unrelated rape case. The tray contained enough of Scott's left-over DNA to show his DNA profile in the later rape sample. The laboratory should have been aware of a problem, for "[t]he batch containing the rape sample showed DNA present in the negative control (a blank sample put through to test for contamination)." (Rennison 2012).

As a result of the error, Scott was charged with "a violent attack on a woman in Manchester – carried out when he was hundreds of miles away in Plymouth." (Doyle 2012). After he spent months in prison, the charge was dismissed. "Phone records showed he was 300 miles away on the south coast when the rape took place." Scott described the experience as a "living nightmare": "They kept me in a segregation wing which was full of rapists and paedophiles. I suffered lots of verbal abuse and other inmates spitting at us and shouting 'paedos.'" Ibid.

References
Acknowledgments
  •  Thanks to Bill Thompson for alerting me to the Denver case.
Copyr. (c) DH Kaye 2014

Tuesday, 24 December 2013

Breathalyzers and Beyond: The Unintuitive Meanings of "Measurement Error" and "True Values" in the 2009 NRC Report on Forensic Science

Five years ago, the National Research Council released its eagerly awaited and repeatedly postponed report on "Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward." One theme of the report was that forensic experts must present their findings with due recognition of Rumsfeldian "known unknowns." For example, the report repeatedly referred to "the importance of ... a measurement with an interval that has a high probability of containing the true value" (NRC Committee 2009, p. 121), and it referred to "error rates" for categorical determinations (ibid., pp. 117-22). 

Earlier this year, UC-Davis law professor and evidence guru Edward Imwinkelried and I submitted a letter urging the Washington Supreme Court to review a case raising the issue of whether the state courts should admit point estimates of blood or breath alcohol concentration without an accompanying quantitative estimate of the uncertainty in each estimate. (The court denied review.) Since the NRC report uses breath-alcohol measurements to explain the meaning of its call for interval estimates, one would think that the report would have a good illustration of a suitable interval. But that is not what I found. The report's illustration reads as follows:
As with all other scientific investigations, laboratory analyses conducted by forensic scientists are subject to measurement error. Such error reflects the intrinsic strengths and limitations of the particular scientific technique. For example, methods for measuring the level of blood alcohol in an individual or methods for measuring the heroin content of a sample can do so only within a confidence interval of possible values. In addition to the inherent limitations of the measurement technique, a range of other factors may also be present and can affect the accuracy of laboratory analyses. Such factors may include deficiencies in the reference materials used in the analysis, equipment errors, environmental conditions that lie outside the range within which the method was validated, sample mix-ups and contamination, transcriptional errors, and more.

Consider, for example, a case in which an instrument (e.g., a breathalyzer such as Intoxilyzer) is used to measure the blood-alcohol level of an individual three times, and the three measurements are 0.08 percent, 0.09 percent, and 0.10 percent. The variability in the three measurements may arise from the internal components of the instrument, the different times and ways in which the measurements were taken, or a variety of other factors. These measured results need to be reported, along with a confidence interval that has a high probability of containing the true blood-alcohol level (e.g., the mean plus or minus two standard deviations). For this illustration, the average is 0.09 percent and the standard deviation is 0.01 percent; therefore, a two-standard-deviation confidence interval (0.07 percent, 0.11 percent) has a high probability of containing the person’s true blood-alcohol level. (Statistical models dictate the methods for generating such intervals in other circumstances so that they have a high probability of containing the true result.)
(Ibid., pp. 116-17.)

What is troublesome about this explanation? Let me count the ways.

1. "Measurement error" does not refer to all errors of measurement

"[D]eficiencies in the reference materials used in the analysis, equipment errors, environmental conditions that lie outside the range within which the method was validated, sample mix-ups and contamination, transcriptional errors, and more" all "can affect the accuracy of laboratory analyses." Nevertheless, they do no count as "measurement error" because they are "factors other than the inherent limitations of the measurement technique." Not being "intrinsic [to] the particular scientific technique," they fall outside the committee's definition of "measurement error."

That narrow definition calls to mind the claims of some fingerprint analysts that the ACE-V method has an "methodological" error rate of zero because the only possibility for error arises when a human being does not apply the method perfectly. The difference, however, is that one can measure the errors when the breathalyzer has no deficient reference materials, no extreme environmental conditions, no sample mix-ups and contamination, no transcriptional errors, and so on. The fingerprint analyst, in contrast, is the measuring instrument, and it is impossible to distinguish between instrument measurement error and human error in that context.

There is nothing illogical in quantifying some but not all measurement errors when some are more readily and validly quantifiable than others. Machines might not be tested periodically to ensure that they are operating as they are supposed to (e.g., DiFilipo 2011; Sovern 2012), but whether one can usefully build that possibility into the computation of the uncertainty of a measurement that might be suitable for courtroom testimony is not clear. Yet, using the seemingly all-encompassing phrase "measurement error" in a narrow, technical sense -- to denote only the noise inherent in the apparatus when operated under certain conditions -- is potentially misleading.

2. "True values" are not true blood-alcohol levels.

Because the committee's example of "measurement error" quantifies only "intrinsic" error, its statement that "a two-standard-deviation confidence interval (0.07 percent, 0.11 percent) has a high probability of containing the person’s true blood-alcohol level" also is easily misunderstood. The confidence interval (CI) for "true values" does not pertain to the actual blood-alcohol level. That level can differ from the point estimate of 0.09 for other reasons, making the real uncertainty greater than ± 0.02.

In addition, a breathalyzer measures alcohol in the breath, not in the bloodstream. The concentrations are related, but the precise functional relationship varies across individuals (e.g., Martinez & Martinez 2002). This is another source of uncertainty not reflected in the committee's CI for blood-alcohol concentration (BAC), although the committee could have sidestepped this issue by referring to breath-alcohol concentration (BrAC).

3. The standard error of the breathalyzer would be determined differently.

The NRC committee imagines using a breathalyzer to make three measurements of the same breath sample. The parenthetical, concluding sentence about "statistical models" for "other circumstances" suggests that the committee realized that this approach is not one that anyone would use to estimate the noise in the apparatus. The breathalyzer should be tested on many samples with known concentrations to ensure that it is not biased and to quantify the extent of the random variations about those known values. Manufacturers perform such tests (e.g., Coyle et al. 2010).

4. A CI of ±2 standard errors might not have "a high probability of containing the person’s true blood-alcohol level"

Let's put aside all the concerns raised so far. Suppose that the errors in the machine's measurement always are normally distributed about the true value in a breath sample; that the applicable standard deviation for this distribution is 0.01; and that the single measured value is 0.09. Is it now true that the interval 0.09 ± 0.02 "has a high probability of containing the person’s true blood-alcohol level"?

Maybe. Two standard errors give an interval with a confidence coefficient of approximately 95%. That is to say that this one interval comes from a procedure that generates intervals that cover the true value about 95% of the time. It is tempting to say that the probability that the interval in question covers the true value therefore is 95%.

But let's think about how the sample came to be tested. The arrested officer picks someone out of a population of motorists. The motorists have varying levels of BrACs, and the officer has some level of skill in spotting the ones who might well be inebriated. Suppose that the drivers the officer stops and tests have BrACs that are normally distributed with mean 0.04 and standard deviation 0.01. The officer's breathalyzer is functioning according to manufacturer's specifications, and the standard deviation in its measurements is 0.01, as in the NRC report. Having obtained a measurement of 0.08 on the one driver's breath sample, what is a high probability interval for true BrAC in this one breath sample? Is it 0.07 to 0.11?

It turns out the probability that the true BrAC falls within the NRC's interval is only 24% (applying equations 2.9 and 2.10 in Gelman et al. 2004). If the officer stopped drivers who whose mean BrAC were greater than 0.04 or with more variable BrACs, the probability for the NRC's interval being correct would be greater. If, for example, the standard deviation in this group were 0.02 instead of 0.01 (and the mean were still 0.04), then the probability for the NRC's interval would be 87%.

Of course, we do not know much about the distribution of BrAC in the group that the officer stops. As indicated above, this distribution would depend on the drinking habits of drivers in the town and the officer's skill in pulling over drunken drivers. The choice of a normal distribution with the parameters mentioned above is not likely to be realistic. But whatever the distribution may be, it, along with the single measured value, bears on the true value of the tested driver's BrAC. This fact makes it tricky to quantify the probability that the NRC's CI includes the driver's BrAC.

* * *

The NRC Report was certainly correct to call on forensic scientists to develop better measures of the uncertainty in their findings and to apply them in their reports and testimony. But figuring out what these measures should be and how to use them is a formidable challenge. Meeting this challenge will be a lot harder than the simple example of a confidence interval in the report might suggest.

References

Sunday, 22 December 2013

Forensic Science’s Latest Proof of Uniqueness

A federally funded study on the "Determination of Unique Fracture Patterns in Glass and Glassy Polymers" affirms that fracture-pattern matches are unique. The researchers believe their work permits experts to continue to provide their "usually conclusive" testimony about cracked glass and plastic.

"The purpose of the research" undertaken at the University of California at Davis's graduate program in forensic science was "to provide a first, objective scientific background that will illustrate that repetitive fractures, under controlled conditions on target materials such as glass window panes and glass bottles, are in fact different and unique. In this phase of our study, we fractured glass window panes, glass bottles (clear wine bottles), and polymer tail light lens covers. Each and every fracture was documented in detail for subsequent inter-comparison and to illustrate the uniqueness of the fracture pattern." (Tulleners et al. 2013, p. 7).

Not surprisingly, the researchers found that all their fractures were distinguishable. In all, they conducted 5,310 pairwise comparisons by examining the fracture patterns in all pairs formed within each of the three groups of 60 items. This finding, they concluded, "should aid the practitioner in any court testimony involving the significance of fracture matching of broken glass and polymers materials." (Ibid., p. 23).

What testimony might this be? "For the forensic community, the ability to piece together glass fragments in order to show a physical fit or a 'Physical Match' is the strongest evidentiary finding of an association." (Ibid., p. 6) "The usual statement is that 'the evidence glass fragment was physically matched to another glass establishing thus both share a common origin.'" (Ibid.) This testimony, the researchers suggest, is just fine: "we are substantiating the individuality of glass and polymer fractures under closely controlled conditions." (Ibid., p. 3, emphasis added). Thus, "[t]his research should enhance the capability of the analyst to testify in a court of law as to the uniqueness of a fracture." (Id., p. 61, emphasis added).

But why would the analyst want to claim universal uniqueness? Forensic science’s hoary division of its world into two parts -- "unique" feature sets and "class" characteristics -- is an article of faith. (E.g., Kaye 2009). The latest study certainly is of some use in confirming the intuition that fracture patterns are highly variable. The existence of varying patterns is one fact that makes "fractography" evidence, as it is called in the field, probative. But the study’s explanation of how it proves that every pattern is unique seems like a parody of scientific reasoning. The explanation is this:
In this research, it is hypothesized that every fracture forms a unique and nonreproducible fracture pattern. Alternately, it may be that some fracture patterns may be reproduced from time to time. If it is found that each fracture forms a unique and nonreproducible fracture pattern, then this finding will support the theory that coincidental duplication of fracture patterns cannot be attained. However, if duplicate fracture patterns are found, this would falsify the null hypothesis and show that some fracture patterns may be reproduced from time to time.
(Ibid., p. 27). Such is the power of the unique-vs-class thinking. This impoverished dichotomy collapses a spectrum of possible states of nature into two discrete states. Combined with a cartoon-like version of Sir Karl Popper’s criterion of falsification, it leads the researchers to believe that their failure to find a class characteristic proves the "null hypothesis" of uniqueness.

True, the failure to find "duplicate fracture patterns" in a small sample "support[s] the theory that coincidental duplication of fracture patterns cannot be attained." (Or it would in a study in which the analyst deciding on whether two patterns were the same did not already know that all of them came from different objects.)

But it also supports the alternative theory that coincidental duplication can be attained. Instead of taking no-duplication-is-possible as the “null hypothesis,” we could postulate that, on average, 1 in every 10,000 fractures of the items tested would produce indistinguishable fracture patterns. Or, we could hypothesize that the mean duplication rate is 1/100,000. Since we just spinning out hypotheses, we could pick still other rates.

A great many such hypotheses seem compatible with the finding of no duplicates among 180 fractures. Observing a unique set of patterns in the sample supports (to varying degrees) a wide range of hypotheses about the duplication probability. To indulge an overly simplistic model, if we were to assume that the probability of detecting a duplicated pattern in each of the 5,310 comparisons were some identical, albeit small, number, then the 95% confidence interval for this duplication probability would go from zero (uniqueness) all the way up to 1/1770. (See Eypasch et al. 1995). To testify that the experiment supports only “the theory that coincidental duplication of fracture patterns cannot be attained” would be foolish. A more accurate statement would be that it supports the theory that duplication occurs at an unknown, but not very large, rate.

To be sure, there is reason to believe that duplication is improbable, and the UC-Davis study adds to our knowledge of fracture patterns. However, fractographers should think twice (or more!) before they testify that the study demonstrates the utter uniqueness of all fractures. They gain little by embracing the claim of universal uniqueness (Cole 2009; Kaye et al. 2011), and this study does not deliver on the promise of "objective criteria to determine the uniqueness of a fit." (Tulleners et al., p. 7).

References
  • Simon A. Cole, 2009. Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification. Law, Probability and Risk 8:233-255
  • Ernst Eypasch, Rolf Leferinga, C K Kuma, Hans Troid, 1995. Probability of Adverse Events That Have Not Yet Occurred: A Statistical Reminder. Brit. Med. J. 311:619, available at http://www.bmj.com/content/311/7005/619
  • David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein & Jennifer L. Mnookin, 2011. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence. New York: Aspen Pub. Co. (2d ed.)
  • David H. Kaye, 2009. Identification, Individuality, and Uniqueness: What's the Difference? Law, Probability & Risk 8:85-89, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261970 (abstract)
  • Frederic A. Tulleners, John Thornton & Allison C. Baca, 2013. Determination of Unique Fracture Patterns in Glass and Glassy Polymers, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241445.pdf

Sunday, 8 December 2013

Error on Error: The Washington 23

Frequently cited in warnings on the risks of errors in DNA typing is a 2004 article prepared by unnamed staff of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. In one highly praised book, for instance, Sheldon Krimsky of Tufts University and Tania Simoncelli, then with the ACLU, wrote that the paper “reported that forensic scientists at the Washington State Patrol Laboratory had made mistakes while handling evidence in at least 23 major criminal cases over three years” [1, p. 280]. The article itself begins “[c]ontamination and other errors in DNA analysis have occurred at the Washington State Patrol crime labs, most of it the result of sloppy work” [2].

Laboratory documentation of “sloppy work” should be encouraged. It should be scrutinized inside and outside of the laboratory. Within the laboratory, it can be a path to improvements. Outside the laboratory world, reporting on problems, quotidian and catastrophic alike, can increase the level of public and professional understanding of how forensic science is practiced. However, it is important to be clear about the nature, severity, and implications of specific “mistakes,” “errors,” and “contamination.” These terms cover a variety of phenomena.

Even before the earliest days of PCR-based DNA typing, it has been known that “contamination” is an omnipresent possibility. It can result from extraneous DNA in materials from companies that supply reagents and equipment, from the introduction of the analyst’s DNA into the sample being analyzed (“for example, when the analyst talks while handling a sample, leaving an invisible deposit of saliva” [2]), from inadequate precautions against transferring DNA from one test with one sample over to another test with a different sample (a form of “cross-contamination”), and so on. Many forms of contamination are detectable, but they can complicate or interfere with the interpretation of an STR profile [3]. Cross-contamination of a crime-scene sample with a potential suspect’s DNA either before or after it reaches the laboratory is particularly serious because it could result in a false match.

As described in an appendix below, it appears that only one of the 23 cases (#22) involved a false report of a match, and the report was corrected before any charges were filed. However, Bill Thompson presented a different case as a premier example of "false cold hits" [4, p. 230]. In his latest publication on errors in DNA typing, he wrote that
[W]hile the Washington State Crime Patrol Laboratory a cold-case investigation of a long-unsolved rape, it found a DNA match to a reference sample in an offender database, but it was a sample from a juvenile offender who would have been a toddler at the time the rape occurred. This prompted an internal investigation at the laboratory that concluded that DNA from the offender's sample, which had been used in the laboratory for training purposes, had accidentally contaminated samples from the rape case, producing a false match. [4, p. 230].
Thompson noted that he "assisted the newspaper in the investigation" [4, p. 341 n.12]. Apparently, he was referring to case #5 in the article (although the article labels it a homicide case). In any event, it is the only case Thompson lists as an example of a false match in Washington.

My conclusion is that the Washington cases certainly establish that mistakes of many types can occur in DNA laboratories and that some types of mistakes can produce false matches, false accusations, and even false convictions. But none of the 23 are themselves instances of false charges or false convictions. This conclusion neither condones the mistakes nor excludes the possibility that DNA has produced such outcomes in Washington.  But it may help put the 23 cases and the writing about them in perspective.

References
  1. Sheldon Krimsky & Tania Simoncelli, Genetic Justice: DNA Data Banks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil Liberties (2011)
  2. DNA Testing Mistakes at the State Patrol Crime Labs, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 21, 2004, 10:00 pm, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/DNA-testing-mistakes-at-the-State-Patrol-crime-1149846.php
  3. Terri Sundquist & Joseph Bessetti, Identifying and Preventing DNA Contamination in a DNA-Typing Laboratory, Profiles in DNA, Sept. 2005, at 11-13, http://www.promega.com/~/media/Files/Resources/Profiles%20In%20DNA/802/Identifying%20and%20Preventing%20DNA%20Contamination%20in%20a%20DNA%20Typing%20Laboratory.ashx
  4. William C. Thompson, The Myth of Infallibility, in Genetic Explanantions: Sense and Nonsense 227 (Sheldon Krimsky & Jeremy Gruber eds. 2013)
Related postings
APPENDIX
23 and Me

This Appendix quotes the newspaper descriptions in full, then offers my own remarks.

EXAMPLE NO. 1
Problem: Cross-contamination
When and where: July 2002, Spokane lab
Forensic scientist: Lisa Turpen
Case: child rape
What happened: Turpen contaminated one of four vaginal swabs with semen from a positive control sample. Corrected report issued almost two years later in March 2004. ....Yakima prosecutors offered plea deal during the trial, with defendant pleading guilty to two gross misdemeanors. Turpen's mistake was a factor, according to defense.”

REMARKS: I do not know what “semen from a positive control sample” means. When DNA from a cell line is used to ensure that PCR is amplifying those alleles, the cell-line DNA is known as a positive control sample. This example does not sound like a case of contamination involving that kind of a positive control. Adding semen to a vaginal swab obviously is unacceptable, but if the other three swabs produced a single male DNA profile and the fourth showed two male profiles in a case involving a single rapist, the anomalous profile would not be falsely matched to anyone.

EXAMPLE NO. 2
Problem: Erroneous lab report
When and where: August 2002, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: William Stubbs
Case: Fatal police shooting of Robert Thomas
What happened: Two hours before testifying at inquest, Stubbs discovered his crime lab report was wrong and notified prosecutor. His report said test found brown stain on gun was likely blood, but his notes had no indication of blood. ... Corrected report issued in September 2002. ... Co-worker reviewing case did not catch mistake.

REMARK: Does not involve DNA typing.

EXAMPLE NO. 3
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: April 2001, Spokane lab
Forensic scientists: Charles Solomon, Lisa Turpen
Case: rape/kidnapping/assault
What happened: In separate tests, Solomon and Turpen contaminated hair-root tests with their own DNA. Solomon also contaminated reference blood sample with his DNA. ...Three defendants were convicted.

REMARK: There is no suggestion of a false match here.

EXAMPLE NO. 4
Problem: Testing error
When and where: September 2002, Marysville lab
Forensic scientist: Mike Croteau
Case: robbery/assault
What happened: Rushing to meet deadlines, Croteau mixed up reference samples from victim and suspect. He reported incorrect findings verbally to prosecutor, then discovered his mistake. ... Defendant pleaded guilty.

REMARK: What is the mistake here? It must be something more than using the wrong names for the two samples that were compared to produce a false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 5
Problem: Cross-contamination
When and where: August 2003, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: Robin Bussoletti
Case: homicide
What happened: Bussoletti likely contaminated work surface while testing a blood sample from a convicted felon during training. Next DNA analyst who used work station noticed contamination in chemical solution that is not supposed to contain DNA.

REMARKS: Definitely sloppy -- and potentially falsely incriminating if work surface was then used without a thorough cleaning for casework.

EXAMPLE NO. 6
Problem: Cross-contamination
When and where: January 2004, Tacoma lab
Forensic scientist: Jeremy Sanderson
Case: child rape
What happened: Sanderson failed to change gloves between handling evidence in two cases. He noticed contamination in chemical solution. ... Defendant convicted and sent to prison.

REMARK: Is this a case of cross-contamination of samples?

EXAMPLE NO. 7
Problem: Error during testing
When and where: June 2002, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: Denise Olson
Case: aggravated murder
What happened: Olson did initial test to look for blood on shoes. She got weak positive result, then threw out swabs. She didn't document findings or notify police. Kirkland police complained because discarded swabs couldn't be tested for DNA. ... Shoes sent to private lab for retesting. ... Defendant Kim Mason convicted and sentenced to life without release.

REMARK: Not a false match

EXAMPLE NO. 8
Problem: Error in DNA test interpretation
When and where: October 1998, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: George Chan
Case: rape
What happened: Chan misstated statistical likelihood of match with suspect. Co-worker reviewing case didn't catch error. ... Pierce County prosecutor noticed mistake at pretrial conference in September 2000. ... Defendant convicted.

REMARK: Not a false match

EXAMPLE NO. 9
Problem: Error in testing procedure
When and where: September 2002, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: Denise Olson
Case: robbery/assault
What happened: Olson tested known DNA samples before evidence collected at crime scene -- a violation of lab procedure aimed at preventing cross-contamination. A co-worker caught the mistake while reviewing the case.... Tests were redone. ... Defendant pleaded guilty.

REMARK: This departure from protocol raises the risk of an incriminating case of cross-contamination, but there is no indication that any cross-contamination occurred.

EXAMPLE NO. 10
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: November 2002, Tacoma lab
Forensic scientist: Mike Dornan
Case: rape

What happened: Dornan contaminated DNA test of victim's underwear with his own DNA. May have resulted from talking during testing process.... Defendant pleaded guilty.

REMARK: No false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 11
Problem: Unknown source of contamination
When and where: January 2004, Tacoma lab
Forensic scientist: Christopher Sewell
Case: homicide
What happened: Sewell found low level of DNA from unknown source in blood sample from victim. May have come from blood transfusion of victim before death. ... Case pending.

REMARK: The “unknown source of contamination” does not seem to have produced a false match if peak heights indicated a minor contributor, and the major contributor was the defendant,

EXAMPLE NO. 12
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: March 2004, Tacoma lab
Forensic scientist: William Dean
Case: rape
What happened: Dean contaminated control sample with his own DNA while testing police evidence. ... No suspect.

REMARK: No suspect, no contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 13
Problem: Unknown source of contamination
When and where: January 2003, Spokane lab
Forensic scientist: Lisa Turpen
Case: murder
What happened: Turpen found unidentified female DNA in control sample while testing evidence in Stevens County double-murder case.... Defendant convicted.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 14
Problem: Unknown source of contamination
When and where: January 2003, Spokane lab
Forensic scientist: Lisa Turpen
Case: robbery/kidnapping
What happened: Turpen found unidentified female DNA in control sample while testing evidence in Yakima County case. Evidence tested same day as evidence in Example No.13.... Case pending.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 15
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: September 2003, Marysville lab
Forensic scientist: Greg Frank
Case: murder
What happened: Frank contaminated control samples with his own DNA during testing in Snohomish County case. ...Case pending.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 16
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: September 2003, Marysville lab
Forensic scientist: Greg Frank
Case: child molestation/rape
What happened: Frank contaminated control samples with his own DNA during testing in Kitsap County case. ... Defendant pleaded guilty.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLES NO. 17 & 18
Problem: Unknown source of contamination
When and where: October 2003, Seattle lab
Forensic scientists: Phil Hodge, Amy Jagman
Cases: unknown
What happened: Hodge and Jagman both discovered unknown source of contamination in chemical used during DNA testing. Chemical discarded and evidence retested.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 19
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: October 2002, Spokane lab
Forensic scientists: Charles Solomon, Lisa Turpen
Case: murder
What happened: Solomon found Turpen's DNA on three bullet casings retrieved from scene of Richland double murder. ... Defense expert disputed this at trial, testifying that DNA profile belonged to unknown female. ... Defendant Keith Hilton convicted.

REMARK: No false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 20
Problem: Cross-contamination
When and where: February 2002, Tacoma
Forensic scientist: Mike Dornan
Case: child rape
What happened: Dornan contaminated evidence in King County rape case with DNA from a previous case, likely by failing to properly sterilize scissors. ... Defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge before contamination was discovered.

REMARK: I presume that if the previous case were the defendant’s and that is what led to the charge against the defendant, the newspaper would have so stated. That would have been a false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 21
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: January 2001, Marysville lab
Forensic scientist: Brian Smelser
Case: rape
What happened: Smelser contaminated three tests with his own DNA in Kirkland rape case. Prosecutor had to send remaining half-sample to California lab for retesting.... Defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charge.

REMARK: No false match.

EXAMPLE NO. 22
Problem: Error in testing
When and where: December 2002, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: Denise Olson
Case: rape/attempted murder
What happened: Olson misinterpreted DNA results, telling Seattle police their suspect was a match. Co-worker caught error 11 days later, just as charges were about to be filed.... Case unsolved.

REMARK: A false positive report (not resulting from contamination).

EXAMPLE NO. 23
Problem: Self-contamination
When and where: January 2004, Seattle lab
Forensic scientist: George Chan/William Stubbs
Case: child rape
What happened: Chan's DNA found in suspect's boxer shorts by Stubbs. Problem traced to Chan talking to Stubbs during testing.... Suspect pleaded guilty.

REMARK: No contamination of a crime-scene or suspect sample, no false match.